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Abstract: Standard accounts of the ad baculum locate its fallaciousness either in irrelevance or dialogue shift. Such
accounts, however, fail to explain its persuasiveness. This paper offers a new account where the real target of an ad
baculum is an audience downstream from the initial ad baculum exchange. This means that the ad baculum consists
in misrepresenting the quality of evidence by means of the forced adoption of a particular standpoint.
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1. Introduction
Suppose you and I are having an argument about whether p. You hold that p; I hold that not-p.
You adduce a series of arguments, so do I. We get nowhere, but, because I’m persistent, I say: “if
you continue with this p business I’m going to punch you in the face.” Were I a more subtle person,
I might have achieved the same result by suggesting that continuing to assert that p might occasion
the revelation of some embarrassing personal fact about you. My arguments are ad baculum—
appeals to the force. Commonly, a fallacious ad baculum argument is one where an arguer uses a
threat to induce someone to draw a particular conclusion irrelevant to threat (Van de Vate, 1975,
p. 43; Walton, 2014, p. 296). At first pass, it’s somewhat baffling that anyone ever thought that
the ad baculum was ever, as they say, a thing in argumentation studies. For, it would seem to be
blindingly obvious even to the least competent of arguers that no amount of force is going to make
someone believe something. Beliefs, by most plausible accounts, are involuntary and do not
respond to commands, bribes, or other inducements (Cohen, 1992; Woods, 1998, p. 496). If that
were not bad enough, the threat of force, even if subtle, would seem to call attention to the lack of
rational grounds for the arguer’s conclusion. Since fallacies are supposed in some sense to appear
to be stronger arguments than they are, it would be odd that in the case of the ad baculum there is
no deception. Indeed there cannot be any, because if the threat is going to have any force, it needs
to be recognized for what it is.
Despite this massive plausibility problem, one still finds accounts of the ad baculum in
popular critical thinking or introduction to logic texts (I’ll discuss one below). This is somewhat
surprising (but only somewhat), because the comparatively extensive scholarly literature on the
subject has essentially pronounced it not to be anything like what these texts describe. Naturally,
I’m speaking generally because I don’t have a lot of space, but even the most ontologically
generous accounts barely leave it standing (Brinton, 1992; Van de Vate, 1975; Walton, 2000).
Many deny that the common account is any kind of argumentative scheme at all (or that if it is a
scheme, there is nothing logically wrong with it) (e.g., Wreen, 1989). For Pragma-dialectics, the
ad baculum breaks a rule of behavior rather than any kind of logical rule (van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004, p. 180). More recently Budzynska and Witek (2014) have suggested looking
beyond the inference-schematic features of the ad baculum to appreciate it as a “complex rhetorical
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technique” where the ethotic components of the person making the ad baculum argument are
central to understanding how it works.
In this paper, I am going to argue that the ethotic features of ad baculum arguments can
explain the most baffling feature about them: how do you get someone to believe something by
force? The answer I will give, in short, is you don’t get them to believe it, you get them to adopt it
so that other people believe it. My argument relies on the oft-overlooked distinction (at least in
argumentation studies) between beliefs and commitments (Paglieri & Castelfranchi, 2006;
Godden, 2012, 2015). You can get someone to adopt a commitment through force because you
adopt commitments voluntarily. Beliefs, by contrast, are involuntary, and mainly responsive to
evidence. Since I am arguing that the approach to the ad baculum has been inadequate, I will argue
for my thesis through an analysis of two famous cases of this approach. I’ll follow this with some
observations and conclusions.
2. An (in)famous account of the ad baculum.
I want to start with a well-known account of the ad baculum, Hurley and (new this edition)
Watson’s widely used Concise Introduction to Logic, as of 2016 in its 13th edition. It is noteworthy
that this text, which has changed little across its many editions, has already been subjected to
detailed (and scathing) critique in the ad baculum literature.1 I don’t mean to pile on or even
duplicate that work. I think rather that there is something of value in Hurley and Watson’s attempt
that the critique has missed.
Hurley and Watson begin their discussion of the fallacies of relevance with the
argumentum ad baculum, or the “appeal to the ‘stick.’” This fallacy, they write,
occurs whenever an arguer presents a conclusion to another person and tells that person
either implicitly or explicitly that some harm will come to him or her if he or she does not
accept the conclusion (p.129).2
People familiar with the Hurley and Watson text know that, broadly speaking, it takes an informal
logic approach to the problem of fallacies, viewing them as commonly deceptive argument
schemes where the premises do not provide adequate support for the conclusion. This means that
they focus their analysis on the schematic features of the argument, how the premises fail or
succeed in supporting the conclusion. This, I think, is part of the reason their account of the ad
baculum is a mess. In the next section, we will look at an alternative to this.

1

Their analysis of the ad baculum is not all that different from what one would normally encounter in general texts of
this sort. A thorough review of the relevant introduction to logic-type texts would be a waste of time, so let this brief
survey suffice. Copi and Cohen (1998), the ur-text for this kind of approach to fallacies, says “the appeal to force, to
cause the acceptance of some conclusion, seems at first sight so obvious a fallacy as to need no discussion at all” (get
P# in full edition). Baronet’s (2013) definition is virtually identical: “the threat of physical harm, an appeal to force,
can sometimes cause us to accept a course of action which otherwise would be unacceptable” (p.123). He puts the ad
baculum in the fallacies of relevance, claiming that the threat is not “objective evidence” for the conclusion (p.124).
A very recent handbook to fallacies, Bad Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Fallacies in Western Philosophy
(2018) replicates the same basic form: “An argument that appeals to force or fear attempts to make the audience feel
fear at the threat or possibility of harm in order to get them to accept a conclusion” (p.98).
2
Interestingly, Wreen (1989) discusses Hurley’s text at length. What’s surprising is that the definition has not changed
from the 1985 edition. The examples have also barely changed. By contrast, scholars of argumentation, e.g., Groarke
and Tindale (2012) and Bailin and Battersby (2016), have no account of the ad baculum.
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As Hurley and Watson describe the ad baculum, the reasons given for the conclusion are
an implicit or explicit threat of some harm.3 This brings us back to our key question: how can we
force or threaten someone into accepting a conclusion? Their answer to this is somewhat
surprising. First, the examples.
Child to playmate: Sesame Street is the best show on TV, and if you don’t believe me it,
I’m going to call my big brother over here and he’s going to beat you up.
Lobbyist to senator: Senator Casey, of course you support our bill to reduce inheritance
taxes. After all, you wouldn’t want the press to find out about all the contributions you
receive from the Ku Klux Klan. (p.129, emphasis added)
Before adding other comments, it ought to be said that these examples are not implausible. In my
day, kids used to fight over which kind of food tasted best (or worst in some cases). Kids are not
all that great at argument, but adults don’t necessarily fair much better. I was once threatened
(certainly only rhetorically I hope) in an argument over who liberated Italy in World War II. So
it’s at least plausible that people threaten each other this way. The question, however, is what they
want to achieve. One can see that there is something of a confusion here as to whether one forces
another to believe or to accept, or, as in the last case, merely to do something. The conclusion of
the second example is, or at least seems to be, an action: Senator Casey (no relation) is meant to
do something by expressing support for some bill—probably voting or speaking in favor of it in
the Senate chamber. The conclusion of the first example is that the playmate ought to believe
something. These are certainly different things. They’re also different from accepting something,
which was mentioned in the introduction. I am going to return to this below.
Now let’s turn to Hurley and Watson’s analysis. They write:
The appeal to force fallacy usually accomplishes its purpose by psychologically impeding
the reader or listener from acknowledging a missing premise that, if acknowledged, would
be seen to be false or at least questionable. (p. 129)
This is a puzzling claim. Their general analysis of a fallacy of relevance, of which the ad baculum
is the first example, is that the premises are psychologically but not logically relevant to the
conclusion (p.129). In the ad hominem, for instance, the bad character of some arguer is not
relevant to the non-character dependent arguments they make. We think it is relevant, in other
words, when it is not. In the case of the ad baculum, however, the appeal to force impedes
recognition of the questionable premise, rather than seeming or appearing relevant when it isn’t.
Hurley and Watson, somewhat admirably, hereby offer an attempt to explain why someone would
3

I should note that much of the literature on the ad baculum has focused on the passive construction—some harm will
come to him or her—makes this overly broad and so generates many obvious counterexamples. Arguments from
consequences have the same structure. For instance, one might argue that drinking water from a certain source will
lead to sickness. The fear of the sickness in this case is the harmful consequence that will be visited upon their head.
More pointedly, threats in the course of negotiation also have the same structure. For example, “if you do no accept
our demand that you raise salaries, you will face a strike.” Clearly, in this case, the pressure of the strike is the reason
offered for accepting the conclusion (the higher wage). These are exactly the same because the threat will be enforced
by the person doing the threatening, whereas the first case the treat will be realized as a matter of fact: if you drink
dirty water from the river, nature will enforce the threat and make you sick.
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be duped by an ad baculum: they are duped because they’re afraid. If they were not afraid, one
might imagine, then they would notice how bad the argument is. Fallacies, if they’re going to be
fallacies, ought to be deceptive. I am going to argue a bit later that the ad baculum is indeed
deceptive. It’s just not deceptive here. And it’s not even supposed to be. It wouldn’t work if it were
so. More on that later. Let’s look at the reconstruction:
If my brother forces you to admit that Sesame Street is the best show on TV, then Sesame
Street is in fact the best show.
If I succeed in threatening you, then you support the bill to reduce inheritance taxes. (p.
130)
The reconstruction, they argue, makes it clear that the premise—which is the force—does not
imply the conclusion. It’s worth noting that the reconstruction is different in a few important ways
from the original arguments. The original arguments had two different conclusions. In the first
case it was the belief that Sesame Street was the best show; in the second, the willingness to support
the inheritance tax bill.4 The term “support” is notoriously vague in this context. It can mean that
one merely favors something (I support the new President) or that they will engage in certain
actions. The ambiguity of the term makes this somewhat maddening. The first version of the
Sesame Street case has the kid believing that it’s the best show as the conclusion. I think, in other
words, Hurley and Watson have missed what is interesting about their cases. Part of the reason for
this is their informal logic approach: the failure needs to be captured in a scheme and the scheme
is a sorry method for capturing this sort of failure. Another reason they miss what is interesting
about their cases is that they’re unclear as to whether they mean to explain the why ad baculum
arguments are persuasive as a psychological matter, or how they fail as a logical matter. The very
idea of fallacy theory is that these failures match up—something that fails logically happens at the
same time to succeed psychologically.
The main reason, however, is that they didn’t ask themselves what the cases are about. I
mean, why would someone threaten someone in order that they believe something? That’s
psychologically impossible (or at least very difficult) and, as argumentative matter, pointless. The
Sesame Street enforcer, we have to imagine, must know this fact about beliefs and so have some
other scope in mind. Given the limited nature of the example, it’s hard to see what it might be. But
one thing that would make sense is that the addressee’s acceptance of the proposition has some
kind of value. Our interest, after all, in having our conclusions accepted by others is not limited to
those with whom we directly interact. Argument is a great way to spread the word. What is curious
about the ad baculum, as the present cases might have shown, is that we can convert non reasons
(threats) into reasons. This is clearly the case with Senator Casey. There is value in his action of
supporting something. Another less obvious, but equally valuable outcome is the ethotic character
of his supporting something. In other words, the fact that the esteemed Senator Casey deems some
bill worthy of his support is a fact an onlooker might take into account when thinking about it. In
For what it’s worth—and this has been noted by Wreen (1989), neither of these so reconstructed are arguments, at
least according to the criteria laid out by Hurley and Watson—they’re conditional propositions. The second argument,
moreover, such as it is, seems perfectly fine. If indeed they succeed in threatening the luckless Senator Casey, then
he’s going to support the bill. Supporting is an action, again, like voting, or uttering other sentences to the effect the
bill ought to be passed. It’s worth noting in passing that the first example, by contrast, makes a rather different claim
from its reconstruction. The idea now is that Sesame Street is in fact the best show, not merely that the poor bullied
kid must believe that.
4
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other words, the mere acceptance of the proposition, which the Senator is able to do under
compulsion, has potential epistemic value for someone else. The same could be said of the Sesame
Street case, even though it’s harder to imagine who the audience might be. Perhaps the addressee’s
supporting the superiority of Sesame Street has some significance to playground fence-riders or
Sesame Street skeptics. Knowing (or rather believing) that the addressee is a supporter might make
the difference in their reasoning. They, after all, won’t know about the forced nature of the
commitment, so it will seem to them like plausible ethotic evidence. Whatever the case, the scheme
framework employed by Hurley and Watson makes this kind of analysis very difficult.
3. Dialogue shifting
It’s seems obviously true that there exist cases where someone tries to force another to adopt a
standpoint. It seems also plausible to say that one reason they do this is to achieve some
argumentative purpose. I propose that this argumentative purpose is to make their view more
acceptable in the minds of another audience. But, as we’ve seen, it is difficult to see this in a
schematic account such as the one offered by Hurley and Watson. In order to see this, we have to
have a view to the purposes of exchanging reasons. For this reason, Walton and Krabbe’s (1995)
concept of dialogue shift offers, I think, an interesting way to represent what is going on
dialectically with the ad baculum. Since dialogues are normative models for conversation, i.e., for
how conversations ought to go as defined by their purposes, errors will occur when participants
illegitimately (i.e., without permission or warning) shift from one kind of dialogue to another.
Walton and Krabbe envision dialogue shifting as a model for characterizing informal fallacies
(1995, p. 2). One answer to this question is that there has been a dialectical shift that has gone
unnoticed by the participants (1995, pp. 114-115). The second factor leverages the shifting context
to explain the success of the fallacy deployment. Because fallacious moves are sometimes
legitimate, an interlocutor may be duped into taking them to be valid. Critically, in its fallacious
use, the shift is covert, unilateral, or not agreed upon. The heart of the deception, on this new
account, is to shift the context of the argument in a way that the interlocutor doesn’t notice. This
feature—the deception feature—which is a central part of the traditional account, retains its place
in this dialogical account. The interesting thing about the ad baculum, I shall argue here, involves
the blending and confusion of dialogue purposes over time and space. So, roughly: A and B have
one kind of dialogue, then B and C have another on the basis of the original dialogue.
An enlightening comparison case to the ad baculum is what Walton and Krabbe call the
“Fallacy of Bargaining.” This happens when one attempts “to replace an offer for an argument”
(1995, p. 104). In a very general sense, the fallacy of bargaining occurs when a critical discussion
illicitly slips into a negotiation. Given a dialogical approach to fallacies such as that of Walton and
Krabbe, the most direct way for this to occur is when one participant in a critical discussion
demands of the other that they meet half-way, or compromise, on some standpoint. Consider the
following example:
Brava: We’re not getting anywhere by arguing like this and it’s impossible that both of us
are right. Since I argue the cause of the war was states’ rights and you slavery, why don’t
we compromise and say it was partly states’ rights and partly slavery?
Brava’s offer to split the difference constitutes a dialogue shift. Her approach misunderstands or
twists the purpose of a critical discussion, where the aim of each participant is to persuade the
9

other of the truth or correctness of their position. The aim of the negotiation, in contrast, is to make
a deal, and making concessions such as these is critical to that. Brava’s move wouldn’t be out of
place in a negotiation over the price of something, for example. So this seems like a clear instance
in which an argument is suitable in one context but not in another.
While dialogue shifts by participants of dialogues within dialogues are certainly common,
as we have seen, they are easily detectable by minimally competent participants. Consider again
Brava’s attempt to shift the dialogue to negotiation. If Abela has any sense, she will notice the
attempt “to trade an offer for an argument.” Such shifts are indeed comically obvious. Imagine a
case where an atheist is in a disagreement over the number of gods with an Olympian polytheist;
they can hardly split the difference at 6 gods.5 Let’s see how this might work in the case of an ad
baculum. Take the following for example between Frank Forthright, chief of compliance
department at the Globex Corporation and Assistant Divisional Chief, Mr. Malafide.
Forthright: Mr. Malafide, I’d like to show you some of my lab results. As you can see from
the chart, there is a high presence of estradiol—known to cause deformities in frogs—in
our plant’s waste water discharge. I have concluded that we are to blame for the recent
deformities discovered in the frog population.
Mr. Malafide: I don’t agree with your reasoning, Frank. Left out of your analysis are the
deep cuts we will have to make to this department if we have to comply with the law.
Further, you’re not considering the financial hardship your family will face should this
information get leaked to the public.
Malafide’s attempted ad baculum is, like all ad baculums of this sort, a strategy to change what
ought to be an epistemic question about the cause of frog deformity into a practical discussion of
Forthright’s future at Globex Corporation. What is crucial is that the success of this strategy relies
on Forthright’s recognition of the changing context. If he didn’t notice the shift, a clueless
Forthright might puzzle over how Malafide means to offer a meaningful objection and fail to see
that Malafide means to coerce him to take a particular course of action. Far from being an
unannounced shift in dialogue with the intent to fool its victim into taking the bait, the ad baculum
is patently obvious shift in dialogue.
Another feature of the exchange that reveals the obviousness of the offer-for-an-argument
ploy is the actual target of the offer. As we have discussed above, central to the conception of
dialogue at issue here is the concept of commitment. Dialogues concern commitments or
standpoints of the participants. Commitments are not psychological entities and are freely adopted
and abandoned, though they have logical properties (Hamblin, 1970, p. 264; see also Walton &
Krabbe, 1995, p. 21). Commitments are central to the concept of a dialogue theory in part for this
very reason. You can move them like pieces in a game. Crucially, you can adopt commitments
that you do not believe. In other words, the notion that commitments can be traded freely in an
argument is a feature, not a bug, of dialogue theory.
By contrast, no party to a dialogue about beliefs is able to negotiate them because beliefs
are involuntarily held. While it is true that beliefs can be occasioned by deviant causal chains,
where they are brought about indirectly, in general beliefs track reasons or at least the appearance
of reasons. In trading an offer for an argument one is not tracking reasons and this is plainly
obvious. Mr. Malafide knows that Forthright isn’t going to change his mind. It doesn’t matter
5

This is Scott Aikin’s joke.
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anyway, because all Mr. Malafide needs is for Forthright to change his public commitments. This
would mean that Forthright ceases to claim that the frogs have been poisoned by Globex and,
among other things, to stop using this claim as a premise in other reasoning (Cohen, 1992, p. 4). 6
The upshot of this is that while Malafide cannot directly cause Forthright to change his belief with
an inducement or threat, he can more directly control the beliefs of others further down the
conversational chain. In the present case, it’s likely that people who become aware of Globex
corporation’s malfeasance will respond accordingly. But if Malafide deprives of them of the
opportunity to respond to the evidence, then he has effectively controlled their beliefs. In effect,
Malafide’s ad baculum is not directed at Forthright so much as it is at other potential participants
in their extended dialogue. It is directed at them by excluding them. Crucially, they are not
observers or witnesses, as the ad baculum would then prove equally ineffective.
4. Conclusion
In this paper I’ve approached what I take to be an underappreciated problem with the ad baculum
fallacy, namely the fact that you cannot force an interlocutor to believe something. The existence
of ad baculum cases, however, cries out for some kind of explanation. I’ve argued that the ad
baculum stratagem (maybe we should call it a gambit) should be understood in light of its broader
dialogical purposes. This means that the ad baculum actually involves three parties: A and B,the
two just mentioned, and the audience of B, the respondent. While the respondent can never take
force as inducements to believe p, they can take them as reasons to commit to p. Their commitment
to p may then seen by their audience as evidence for p—the fact that Joe Schmo supports the bill
is good reason to think that the bill is a good one.
A second consequence is that force, threat, and/or sanction is not the operative feature in
this scheme. This three-party scheme works just as well with bribery or arguments ad carotam (as
Bermejo-Luque, 2008, has suggested). The key fact this that someone can voluntarily trade their
commitment to some proposition to avoid harm (in the case of the ad baculum) or for some gain
(in the case of the ad carotam). This is why Walton and Krabbe assimilated ad baculum arguments
to “the fallacy of trading an offer for an argument.” The trick of the ad baculum gambit (after all
it could backfire) is to convert a negotiated or purchased commitment into evidence.
The expanded conception of the ad baculum has another consequence. Most accounts of
the ad baculum focus on the irrelevance of the threat of force to the truth or acceptability of some
claim. This is certainly true, but the broader goal of the ad baculum is to misrepresent the
dialectical state of play. It means to give the impression that a certain standpoint has more (or
fewer) true adherents than it actually does. A broader view of the ad baculum, if anything, shows
that the inadequacy of the two approaches we have discussed to represent it. As Wreen’s many
detailed analyses of ad baculum argument have shown, if you consider the ad baculum as an
argument scheme, you will never capture what is attractive about it. It will always turn up as a
perfectly reasonable means-end piece of reasoning. Walton’s dialogue approach fairs no better at
capturing it, because the real target of the ad baculum is not, indeed, cannot be there.
If I’ve made any worthwhile points here, and I have my doubts, it’s that sometimes the
approach to argument analysis in informal logic suffers from what we might call methodological
This passage captures the distinction between beliefs and commitments succinctly: “To accept the proposition or
rule of inference that p is to treat it as given that p. More precisely, to accept that p is to have or adopt a policy of
deeming, positing, or postulating that p—i.e., of including that proposition or rule among ones premises for deciding
what to do or think in a particular context, whether or not one feels it to be true that p.” (4; emphasis added).
6
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individualism. Even dialogue theory, with its deeper reach into the structure and purpose of
persuasive communication, stops its analysis at the end of individual argument encounters.
Argumentative exchanges are not necessarily exhausted when the addressee has received the
message. To explain the effect of the ad baculum, it would have to construct a new encounter
where the defect is the insincere commitment—the ad hominem does just this. But that doesn’t do
justice to the strategy of the one who employs the ad baculum. I think our arguments are
fundamentally meant to outlive our encounters. And I don’t think, this is unique to the ad baculum.
Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse have made a similar case with regard to other fallacies (such as the
ad hominem), arguing that even the dialectical model, itself an expansion, incompletely represents
the dialectical situation (2019, p. 181). With the straw man, for example, the purpose is to
misrepresent the quality of an addressee’s argument to an onlooking audience. In contrast to the
ad baculum, however, it is most effective when the addressee is absent and so not able to defend
themselves. For the ad baculum, a critical part of the strategy, however, is that the target audience
isn’t there.
Acknowledgements: Many thanks to Carlos Degollado whose insightful comments as a student
in Philosophy 101 led to this paper.
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